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Abstract
This paper modiﬁes the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model in order to explain the cyclical
behavior of vacancies and unemployment. The modiﬁcations include strategic wage bargaining and
convex labor adjustment costs. We ﬁnd that this setup replicates the cyclical behavior of both labor
market variables remarkably well. First, we show that the model with strategic wage bargaining
matches closely the volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Second, the introduction of convex
labor adjustment costs makes both variables much more persistent. Third, our analysis indicates that
these two modiﬁcations are complementary in generating labor market volatility and persistence.
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The Mortensen-Pissarides job search and matching model1 has become the standard theory of equilibrium
unemployment. Moreover, starting with Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996) and den Haan et al. (2000), sev-
eral authors have shown that the inclusion of labor market frictions improves the propagation mechanism
of standard real-business-cycle models considerably. Recently, however, the job matching model has come
under criticism. Following the inﬂuential work of Shimer (2005), a large literature has emerged which
has shown that the job matching model cannot replicate the cyclical behavior of its two central variables
– vacancies and unemployment.
In particular, Shimer (2005) emphasizes that the job matching model generates insuﬃcient volatility
of vacancies and unemployment at the business cycle frequencies. Indeed, Shimer (2005) challenges not
the job search and matching approach itself, but rather the commonly-used Nash (1953) bargaining
assumption for wage determination. This approach postulates that the household and the ﬁrm divide the
mutual surplus period-by-period according to a constant sharing parameter. This implies that the wage
bill per worker is almost as elastic as the underlying productivity shock, giving ﬁrms only little incentive
to adjust the stock of employment. For this reason, Shimer (2005) proposes to consider alternative
bargaining assumptions that might deliver real wage rigidity. In a related article, Shimer (2004) provides
evidence that real wage rigidity might amplify the volatility of vacancies and unemployment substantially.
Furthermore, Fujita (2004) demonstrates that vacancies in the job matching model are not suﬃciently
persistent. This artifact follows from ﬁrms’ hiring behavior in the job matching model with linear vacancy
posting costs. In response to a positive technology shock, ﬁrms anticipate the sharp and lasting rise in
hiring costs and adjust employment instantaneously. Hence, vacancies spike on impact, but fall back half
way only one period later. Contrary to this pattern, several authors2 have found ample evidence that
the impulse response function of vacancies displays a marked hump-shape, peaking with several quarters
delay. Fujita & Ramey (2007) address this issue by introducing a sunk cost for the creation of new job
positions. This modiﬁcation improves the persistence of vacancies remarkably. Moreover, the impulse
response function of vacancies shows a distinct hump-shape.
The main aim of this paper is to replicate the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment
along both dimensions – volatility and persistence. Therefore, we modify the standard job matching
model in two ways. First, we adopt strategic wage bargaining as introduced into the literature by
Hall & Milgrom (2008). In contrast to (static) Nash bargaining, strategic wage bargaining assumes that
wages are determined by a Rubinstein (1982) game of alternating oﬀers. This approach accounts for the
dynamic and interactive character of wage negotiations. The main diﬀerence between Nash bargaining
and strategic wage bargaining lies in the players’ threat points. Under Nash bargaining, both players’
threat points are determined by their respective outside alternative, i.e. the value of labor market search.
Under strategic wage bargaining, however, the prospective mutual surplus gives both players strong
incentives to hold-up the bargaining process until an agreement is reached. Thus, both players’ threat
points are determined by their respective value of bargaining. As argued by Hall & Milgrom (2008), the
value of bargaining is much less sensitive to current labor market conditions than the outside alternative.
In our benchmark model, strategic wage bargaining reduces the elasticity of the wage bill per worker
by half. As a consequence, the elasticity of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match rises enormously,
providing ﬁrms much stronger incentives to hire new workers in economic upswings. In this way, strategic
wage bargaining gives an endogenous explanation for the observed high degree of labor market volatility.
Second, we combine strategic wage bargaining with convex labor adjustment costs (Gertler & Trigari
2009). In contrast to linear vacancy posting costs, ﬁrms’ hiring costs now are determined by the number
1See Mortensen & Pissarides (1999) as well as Yashiv (2007) for comprehensive surveys.
2See Blanchard et al. (1989), Fujita (2004), Braun et al. (2009), as well as Ravn & Simonelli (2008), among others.
1of vacancies that are ﬁlled, and not by the number of vacancies that are posted. Further, ﬁrms’
hiring costs depend negatively on the current employment level. This implies that marginal matching
costs are no longer a function of market tightness, but of the gross hiring rate. In contrast to market
tightness, the gross hiring rate is much less elastic and much less persistent with respect to technology
shocks. The altered behavior of marginal matching costs removes ﬁrms’ incentives to adjust employment
instantaneously. Instead, the convex shape of the labor adjustment cost function gives ﬁrms strong
incentives to smooth their hiring activities. For this reason, the impulse response function of vacancies
in our benchmark model shows a pronounced hump-shape, peaking several quarters after the shock.
Consequently, the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs makes vacancies much more persistent,
conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Yashiv (2006).
Apart from that, we notice that strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment costs are
complementary in generating labor market volatility and persistence. This interesting result stems from
the speciﬁcation of the hiring cost function. Following Gertler & Trigari (2009), we assume that ﬁrms’
hiring costs depend negatively on the employment level. Hence, convex labor adjustment costs open a
second channel through which strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes labor market volatility. On the one
hand, strategic wage bargaining enhances the volatility of employment by reducing the elasticity of wages.
On the other hand, the larger the stock of employment, the lower are the ﬁrms’ hiring costs. As a result,
the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs generates not only more persistence, but also more
volatility in the labor market.
Furthermore, we introduce the modiﬁed job matching model into a real model of the business cycle
(Andolfatto 1996). This seems advantageous, given that this framework allows for a proper calibration
of the factor income shares and small (accounting) proﬁts (Hornstein et al. 2005). As demonstrated by
Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008), proﬁts have to be small in order to leverage a given productivity shock into
large labor market ﬂuctuations. In this context, Mortensen & Nagypál (2007) have shown that the impact
of strategic wage bargaining on the volatility of vacancies and unemployment increases considerably once
physical capital is considered.
Finally, we ﬁnd that our setup gives rise to two distortionary eﬀects. In the presence of convex labor
adjustment costs, social optimality requires that the wage bill per worker is equal to the household’s
outside alternative. In contrast, we assume that (i) the wage bill per worker is independent of the
ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative and (ii) ﬁrms’ bargaining power is smaller than unity.
This implies that ﬁrms’ private gains from labor market search are generally smaller than their social
contribution. Consequently, the dynamic behavior of the wage bill per worker is not socially optimal
(Hosios 1990). For this reason, we compute the market solution to our setup, based on the model of
Cheron & Langot (2004).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model environment. Section
3 calibrates the model and evaluates its quantitative performance against U.S. data. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model Environment
2.1 Labor Market Flows
The Mortensen-Pissarides job search and matching model presumes that search on the labor market is
frictional. These frictions are represented by a Cobb-Douglas matching function. This function relates
aggregate job matches mt to the number of vacancies that are posted vt and the search eﬀort of the
unemployed e(1 − nt):
mt(vt,(1 − nt)) = χvα
t (e(1 − nt))1−α ≤ min[vt,(1 − nt)], (1)
2where the eﬀort e > 0 (“hours”) per unemployed job searcher is taken to be constant. The ratio between
vacancies and unemployed job searchers measures the tightness of the labor market. Moreover, we assume
that the matching function is linearly homogeneous. Hence, the vacancy ﬁlling rate q(γt) and the job



















These ratios give the expected return on labor market search for ﬁrms and the unemployed, respectively.
One can observe that the tighter the labor market, the longer the expected time to ﬁll a vacancy,
but the shorter the expected search for a job (and vice versa). However, households and ﬁrms do
not internalize the eﬀect of their search activities on the aggregate return rates. This behavior causes
congestion externalities on both market sides.
We assume that new job matches mt are formed at the end of each period. Simultaneously, a fraction
of preexisting jobs is terminated. Consistent with the results of Shimer (2007), we assume the job
destruction rate σ to be constant. Consequently, the law of motion for the aggregate employment level
is given by:
nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + mt. (4)
2.2 The Problem of the Household
The representative household consists of a continuum of individuals who insure each other completely
against idiosyncratic employment risk. The share of employed household members, nt, works lt “hours”
per period on the job while the share 1 − nt (the unemployed) searches e “hours” on the labor market.
Both activities aﬀect utility negatively as they reduce the amount of leisure. We assume the following
per period utility function:
uN(cN
t ,1 − lt) = ln(cN
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The parameter φi,i = 1,2 captures the fact that the valuation of leisure depends on the employment
status. Each employed household member earns the real wage rate wt per hour lt. Hence, ntwtlt
constitutes the labor income of the representative household. In addition, households receive dividends
remitted by ﬁrms πt and rental income rtkt from perfectly competitive capital markets. The state space





. Thus, the maximization problem of the representative
household can be formulated as:
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kt+1 = (1 − δ + rt)kt + πt + ntwtlt − ntcN
t − (1 − nt)cU
t , (6)
nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + q(γt)γt(1 − nt). (7)
3Here, equation (6) is the budget constraint. Equation (7) is the law of motion for the household’s
employment share. Provided stochastic processes for
￿
wt, rt, lt, πt, q(γt)γt | t ≥ 0
￿









t , kt+1 | t ≥ 0
￿
that
maximize its expected discounted utility. These choices have to satisfy following ﬁrst order conditions:
cN
t : λt = uN
1 (cN
t ,1 − lt), (8)
cU
t : λt = uU
1 (cU
t ,1 − e), (9)
kt+1 : λt = βEt[λt+1(1 − δ + rt+1)]. (10)
The ﬁrst order conditions (8) and (9) show that perfect income insurance against idiosyncratic employ-
ment risk allocates the same consumption level to employed and unemployed workers. Equation (10)
gives the familiar Euler equation for consumption.
2.3 The Problem of the Firm
Output is produced by ﬁrms that use capital kt and labor hours (ntlt) as input factors. The production
function is taken to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale. This implies that the model has
a representative ﬁrm. We assume that total factor productivity at is subject to an exogenous shock
speciﬁed by the following autoregressive process:
ln(at) = (1 − ρ)ln(¯ a) + ρln(at−1) + ǫt, with ǫt ∼ N(0,σ2
ǫ) and iid. (11)
The speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s cost function follows Gertler & Trigari (2009). The ﬁrm incurs rental








In contrast to the standard speciﬁcation, labor adjustment costs are determined by the squared number
of new job matches m2
t, the employment level nt, and a constant scale parameter κ/2.3 Consequently,
ﬁrms’ labor adjustment costs are determined by the number of vacancies that are ﬁlled, and not by the
number of vacancies that are posted. In other words, vacancy posting per se is costless. In addition,
notice that ﬁrms take the aggregate vacancy ﬁlling rate q(γt) as given. Hence, from the perspective of
the representative ﬁrm, the number of new job matches mt = q(γt)vt is linear in vacancies.
Moreover, we assume that the representative ﬁrm is large in the sense that it has many workers, and
that it is large enough to eliminate all uncertainty about nt+1. This ensures that all ﬁrms in the model
remain of the same size (Rotemberg 2008). However, the representative ﬁrm in our model is small in the
sense that it is competitive. For this reason, the ﬁrm takes not only the aggregate vacancy ﬁlling rate,
but also the wage bill per worker, wtlt, as given.4 The state space of the ﬁrm is given by the set ΩF
t =
3Several recent studies (Nilsen et al. 2007, King & Thomas 2006, Merz & Yashiv 2007) provide evidence for the empirical
relevance of convex adjustment cost functions at the macro level.
4In words, the representative ﬁrm does not internalize the impact of its hiring activities on the expected wage bill per
worker (∂wt+1lt+1)/(∂nt+1) = 0. Nevertheless, the ﬁrm anticipates the future wage bill per worker wt+1lt+1 correctly. See




. Thus, the representative ﬁrm’s problem can be formulated as:
V(ΩF
t ) = max
kt,vt
￿















nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + q(γt)vt. (15)
Given stochastic processes for
￿
at, wt, rt, lt, q(γt) | t ≥ 0
￿
and an initial condition for n0, the represen-
tative ﬁrm chooses contingency plans
￿
kt, vt, nt+1 | t ≥ 0
￿
that maximize the expected present value of
the dividend ﬂow. The ﬁrst order conditions are given as:
















t+1 + (1 − σ)κxt+1
￿￿
, (17)
where the gross hiring rate mt/nt is denoted by xt. Equation (16) shows the familiar relation between
the real interest rate and the marginal product of capital under perfectly competitive capital markets.
The hiring condition (17) states that the representative ﬁrm posts the optimal number of job vacancies
vt that equalizes expected marginal hiring costs κxt (the left hand side) with the expected present value
of the marginal match in the future (the right hand side). The expected present value of the marginal
match depends on the marginal product per worker (1 − θ)(yt+1/nt+1), the expected wage bill per
worker wt+1lt+1, expected savings on adjustment costs (κ/2)x2
t+1, and expected savings on hiring costs
(1−σ)κxt+1. Savings on adjustment costs capture the fact that each marginal match increases the stock
of employment in the next period, irrespective of when the match is terminated. On the contrary, savings
on hiring costs are only realized if the match survives the following period.
2.4 The Resource Constraint
The following equation gives the resource constraint of our economy. The resource constraint postulates
that output is divided into consumption, gross investment and labor adjustment costs:








2.5.1 The Bargaining Set
Frictions in the labor market create a prospective mutual surplus between ﬁrm-worker matches. This
surplus equals the value added of the match compared to the payoﬀ of both parties in the labor market.
Following Pissarides (2000, chapter 3), we assume that the wage bill per worker wtlt is determined for
each match separately while wages in all other matches are taken as given. Hence, the relevant surplus
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5The surplus share of the household W2(ΩH
t ) equals the diﬀerence between the value of employment and
the value of unemployment.5 The value of employment is made up of the sum of the wage bill per
worker and household’s expected present value of the match in the future. The value of unemployment,
i.e. household’s outside alternative, consists of the current utility gain from leisure and household’s
continuation payoﬀ from labor market search. The surplus of the ﬁrm V1(ΩF
t ) is composed of (i) the
marginal product per worker, (ii) the wage bill per worker, (iii) savings on adjustment costs, and (iv)
the expected present value of the match in the future. A non-arbitrage condition ensures that the outside
alternative of the ﬁrm (i.e. the ex-ante value of an unﬁlled vacancy) is zero. The sum of the marginal
product per worker, i.e. the marginal product per “hour” F2,t times “hours worked” ht, and savings on
adjustment costs (κ/2)x2
t is deﬁned as gross ﬂow value of the marginal match. Given that the weight of
the marginal match is small, both parties take the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match as given during
the bargaining process.
Thus, the mutual surplus St of the marginal ﬁrm-worker match (in units of the consumption good) is
given as the sum of the two shares:
St = (W2(ΩH
t )/λt) + V1(ΩF
t ). (21)
The allocation of the mutual surplus between the household and the ﬁrm determines the wage bill
per worker wtlt. In order to satisfy individual rationality, the equilibrium wage bill per worker has to
make each party at least indiﬀerent between accepting the contract and the forgone outside alternative of
continued labor market search. We obtain the reservation wage bill (per worker) of the household and the
ﬁrm, respectively, by setting the surplus share equal to zero. Equation (19) shows that the reservation
wage bill of the household (wl)min is given by the value of unemployment less household’s expected value
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Analogously, the reservation wage bill of the ﬁrm (wl)max is deﬁned as the gross ﬂow value of the marginal
match plus ﬁrm’s expected present value of the marginal match in the future:6










These two reservation wage bills constitute the lower and the upper bound of the bargaining set which
contains all feasible wage bills (Malcomson 1999). In other words, the equilibrium value of the wage bill
per worker is indeterminate. Therefore, we assume that wages are determined by an ex-post bargaining
game between the household and the ﬁrm. In particular, we consider two alternative approaches –
standard Nash (1953) bargaining and a Rubinstein (1982) game of alternating oﬀers. In addition, the
wage bill per worker is subject to continuous renegotiation whenever new information arrives. In our
discrete-time model, this implies that new matches are formed at the end of each period. However,
bargaining does not start until the beginning of the next period when the new state of technology can be
observed.




6Note that ﬁrms treat hiring costs as sunk. Hence, a ﬁrm would generate negative proﬁts if it accepted a wage bill per
worker close to (wtlt)max (Hall & Milgrom 2008). However, this possibility is ruled out by our calibration.
62.5.2 The Optimal Wage Contract
For the standard job search and matching model (with linear vacancy posting costs), Hosios (1990)
has established a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which both congestion externalities just oﬀset
one another.7 As mentioned above, the congestion externalities arise from the fact that ﬁrms take the
aggregate vacancy ﬁlling rate q(γt) as given when deciding upon the optimal number of vacancies vt.
Thus, from the ﬁrm’s perspective, the number of new job matches mt = q(γt)vt is linear in vacancies.
Accordingly, the ﬁrm’s private gain of the marginal vacancy is given as:
κ = q(γt)V1(ΩF
t+1). (24)
In contrast, the social planner solution accounts for the fact that new job matches are a concave
function of vacancies (see equation 1). Hence, the social planner internalizes that the vacancy ﬁlling
rate decreases in the number of posted vacancies. Therefore, the marginal vacancy yields following social
beneﬁt (see A.1):
κ = αq(γt)St+1. (25)
Social optimality requires that ﬁrms’ private gains from search eﬀort equals their social beneﬁt.
Consequently, ﬁrms’ incentives to post vacancies are eﬃcient if and only if
V1(ΩF
t ) = αSt (26)
holds. In words, the Hosios condition postulates that the private gain per match equals the share α of
the mutual surplus St per match.
In contrast, if ﬁrms internalized the congestion eﬀect on the aggregate vacancy ﬁlling rate correctly,
social optimality would require ﬁrms to gain the entire mutual surplus per match, i.e.:
V1(ΩF
t ) = St. (27)
However, if ﬁrms gained the entire mutual surplus, even though they did not internalize the congestion
eﬀects, the private gains from the marginal vacancy would be larger than the social beneﬁt. Thus, ﬁrms
would have an incentive to “over-hire”. In order to avoid the over-hiring eﬀect, the Hosios condition
requires that ﬁrms gain only the share α of the mutual surplus per match.
Under convex labor adjustment costs, on the contrary, ﬁrms’ hiring costs depend on the number of
vacancies that are ﬁlled q(γt)vt, and not on the number of vacancies that are posted vt. Consequently,
the congestion externalities bias not only ﬁrms’ private gains, but also – to the same extent – ﬁrms’
hiring costs. This removes ﬁrms’ incentives to over-hire, even if they gained the entire mutual surplus
per match. Under these circumstances, the congestion externalities exactly oﬀset each other if and only
if the entire mutual surplus per match accrues to the ﬁrms (see A.2), i.e. if equation (27) holds.
2.5.3 Nash Bargaining
Nash bargaining has become the standard method for wage determination in job matching models.
This approach postulates a number of axioms and derives a unique equilibrium sharing rule for the
mutual surplus. In addition, Nash (1953) proves that exactly the same solution can be generated by
a simultaneous one-shot game. This bargaining game presumes that both parties threaten each other
to terminate the bargain unilaterally rather than to conclude an agreement. Subsequently, both parties
reveal their demands simultaneously. If these demands are not compatible, the match is broken up
7Merz (1995) has generalized the Hosios condition for dynamic models.
7and both players gain only their respective outside alternative, i.e. they return to labor market search.
However, given perfect information and rational players, Nash (1953) shows that both parties agree on











where the original version assumes symmetric bargaining power (ξ = 1/2). The generalized version,
however, allows any value for ξ in the interval (0,1].8 Hence, the solution to our model is given by the
wage bill per worker which maximizes the weighted product of both parties’ surplus shares. This sharing






= (1 − ξ)V1(ΩF
t ). (29)
Thus, in the case of linear vacancy posting costs, the Nash solution generates the socially optimal
bargaining outcome if and only if ﬁrms’ bargaining power ξ coincides with the matching elasticity of
vacancies α. With convex labor adjustment costs, however, social optimality requires that the entire
match surplus St accrues to the ﬁrms (i.e. ξ = 1). This implies that the wage bill per worker wtlt is equal
to the household’s outside alternative. Nevertheless, we consider the general case ξ ∈ (0,1] throughout
our analysis.
The resulting wage bill per worker equals the weighted average of the gross ﬂow value of the marginal
match and household’s outside alternative:
























Household’s outside alternative depends on the ﬂow value of unemployment, i.e. the current utility gain
in leisure (uU − uN
t )/λt, and the continuation payoﬀ from labor market search. The latter, in turn,
depends on the current job ﬁnding rate mt/(1 − nt) times her adjusted share (1 − ξ)/ξ of the expected
present value of a prospective future match κxt. Consequently, household’s outside alternative is very
sensitive to current labor market conditions.
Notably, the expected present value of the current match (see equation 19 and equation 20) does not
enter equation (30). This is due to the fact that the mutual surplus is always allocated according to the
same sharing rule (28). Hence, both expressions widen the bargaining set proportionally, but have no
impact on the bargaining outcome. We deﬁne the replacement rate b as the ratio between the ﬂow value
of unemployment and the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match.
2.5.4 Strategic Wage Bargaining
Hall & Milgrom (2008) highlight that Nash bargaining abstracts from the dynamic and interactive char-
acter of wage negotiations. For that reason, they argue that wages in the job matching model should
be determined by a Rubinstein (1982) game of alternating oﬀers. In particular, Hall & Milgrom (2008)
emphasize the crucial importance of the prospective mutual surplus. The mutual surplus gives both
players strong incentives to conclude the bargaining successfully. Hence, neither party seriously considers
breaking up the bargaining process completely. Given perfect information, this implies that threaten-
ing to terminate the bargaining process is not a credible option (Schelling 1960). Instead, both parties
threaten each other to reject unfavorable demands. Since both parties are impatient, this strategy causes
costly delays and gives them the incentive always to make acceptable demands. Consequently, once
a ﬁrm-worker match has successfully been formed, it is the value of bargaining – and not the outside
8Note that equation 30 and equation 31 are not deﬁned for ξ = 0.
8alternative – that determines the relevant surplus.
In their analysis, Hall & Milgrom (2008) focus on the limiting case in which the time interval between
successive oﬀers decreases to zero. Under these circumstances, they show that both parties agree on
the equilibrium wage bill per worker instantaneously. This allows us to approximate the solution to the
dynamic bargaining game by a corresponding static game (Binmore et al. 1986). The solution to this new
game can be found by maximizing the weighted product of the two surplus shares – like in the standard
Nash solution. However, the solution to this dynamic bargaining problem is inherently diﬀerent from the
Nash solution as the surplus of each party is no longer determined by the respective outside alternative,
but by the losses associated with delays.
Following Hall & Milgrom (2008), we calibrate the dynamic bargaining model to the same steady
state as the standard bargaining model. This simplifying assumption implies that the steady state value
of bargaining coincides with the outside alternative.9 Furthermore, Hall & Milgrom (2008) emphasize
that the value of bargaining might depend less sensitively on current labor market conditions than the
outside alternative. Thus, they take the value of bargaining to be time-invariant. For this reason, we
replace all variables in equation (30) that derive from the outside alternative with their steady state
values (denoted by an over line):



















(1 − ¯ n)
￿
. (31)
This sharing rule is equivalent to Nash bargaining with a constant outside alternative. Given that the
outside alternative is typically pro-cyclical, the dynamic bargaining game generates a less elastic wage bill
per worker than Nash bargaining. Consequently, the households’ share of the surplus falls below (1 − ξ)
in economic upswings (and vice versa). Note that the wage bill per worker satisﬁes individual rationality
as long as it remains within the bargaining set.
In summary, strategic wage bargaining gives rise to two distortionary eﬀects. As discussed above,
social optimality under convex labor adjustment costs requires that the wage bill per worker wtlt is
equal to the household’s outside alternative. In contrast, we assume that (i) the wage bill per worker is
independent of the ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative and (ii) ﬁrms’ bargaining power ξ is
generally smaller than unity, i.e. ξ ∈ (0,1]. Hence, ﬁrms’ private gains from search eﬀort are generally
smaller than their social contribution. In this case, the dynamic behavior of the wage bill per worker is
not socially optimal (Hosios 1990).
2.6 Optimal Labor Eﬀort
The model is closed with the condition for optimal labor eﬀort lt (“hours”). We assume that both parties
have a joint interest to maximize the value of the mutual surplus St. Provided that the marginal product









(1 − lt)η. (32)
This condition determines how the wage bill per worker is split up into the real wage rate per “hour” wt
and “hours” per worker lt.
2.7 Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations {ct, kt+1, vt, nt+1} and prices {rt, wt}, such that:
9Actually, if the value of bargaining coincided with the outside alternative, the respective player would be indiﬀerent
between delaying and terminating the bargain.
9(i) employment relationships are governed by the matching function (1) and the law of motion of
employment (4)
(ii) {ct,kt+1} solves the household’s problem (5) subject to the budget constraint (6) and the law of
motion for its employment share (7)
(iii) total factor productivity follows the exogenous stochastic process (11)
(iv) {kt,vt} solves the ﬁrm’s problem (13) subject to the production technology (14) and the law of
motion for its stock of employment (15)
(v) the resource constraint (18) holds and the perfectly competitive capital market clears
(vi) the wage bill per worker is determined either by Nash bargaining (30) or by strategic wage bargaining
(31)
(vii) hours per worker maximize the mutual surplus (32)
(viii) an initial condition for the state space (k0,n0,z0) is given
Consequently, the competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by following conditions: (1), (4), (8), (9), (10), (11),
(14), (16), (17), (18), either (30) or (31), and (32).
3 Model Evaluation
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model so that one period corresponds to a month. This seems advantageous given that,
in the U.S., the job ﬁnding rate is very high. When we simulate the model, we time-aggregate the artiﬁcial
data to quarterly frequencies in order to make them comparable to the U.S. aggregate time series. Table
1 summarizes the parameter values of our model.
Using data on aggregate income shares, Cooley & Prescott (1995) calibrate the production elasticities
of capital (θ = 0.40) and labor (1 − θ = 0.60). We adopt their conventional values, even though the
production elasticity of labor is slightly larger than the average labor share in our job matching model
(0.58, see table 2). In addition, we set the monthly depreciation rate δ to match an annual rate of 10%
(Kydland & Prescott 1982).
β is chosen to be consistent with a quarterly real interest rate of 1 percent. Following Juster & Staﬀord
(1991), we set the steady state working time of employed household members to l = 1/3 of their dis-
cretionary time endowment. Moreover, Barron & Gilley (1981) estimate that the typical unemployed
primarily engaged in random job search (approximately one half of the sample) spends between 8 and 9
hours per week to contact potential employers. This corresponds to about 25% of the average working time
l. For the given speciﬁcation of preferences (Andolfatto 1996), the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion in labor supply is given as: ν = η−1((1/l)−1). Blundell & Macurdy (1999) provide robust evidence
that the value of ν for annual hours of employed men is between 0.1 and 0.3. For employed women,
Blundell et al. (1988) and Triest (1990) estimate values in the same range. However, Browning et al.
(1999) observe that leisure is more substitutable over shorter intervals than longer ones. Using monthly
data on employed men, MaCurdy (1983) ﬁnds signiﬁcantly higher elasticities (0.3 − 0.7). Hence, we
choose ν equal to 0.5, which implies setting η = 4.
We calibrate the monthly job separation rate to 3.5% (Shimer 2007). This value implies that the
average job duration is 2 1/2 years. Furthermore, the steady state unemployment rate is set to 10
percent (Hall 2005b). This measure includes the oﬃcially unemployed job searchers and the pool of
10marginally attached non-participants (Jones & Riddell 1999). Thus, our calibration implies that the
average job ﬁnding rate, q(γ)γ, is equal to 0.32 (see table 2), which is consistent with the results of Hall
(2005b). The monthly vacancy ﬁlling rate is set to match the quarterly value q(γ) = 0.71 estimated by
van Ours & Ridder (1992).10 Based on the fact that per-period labor adjustment costs “are not much
more than one percent of per-period payroll cost” (Hamermesh & Pfann 1996, p. 1278), we calibrate
aggregate labor adjustment costs ψ equal to 1% of aggregate output. This value implies that the average
replacement ratio b is equal to 63%. This value is somewhat larger than the upper bound (b = 40%)
estimated by Shimer (2005). However, Shimer (2005) interprets b entirely as an unemployment beneﬁt.
In our model b includes also utility costs of working, e.g. leisure value of unemployment or the value
of home production (Hagedorn & Manovskii 2008). Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the size of the
leisure value of unemployment is scarce (Holmlund 1998). According to Costain & Reiter (2008), the
upper bound of the utility costs of working is equal to 75%. Hence, our value seems reasonable.11
We calibrate the matching elasticity of unemployment to α = 0.5. This value is within the plausible
range (0.5 − 0.7) proposed by Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001). In addition, we assume symmetrically
distributed bargaining power, i.e. ξ = 0.5 (Svejnar 1986). Thus, as mentioned above, our model gives
rise to two distortionary eﬀects. On the one hand, we assume that the wage bill per worker is independent
of the ﬂuctuations in the household’s outside alternative. On the other hand, ﬁrms’ bargaining power ξ
is strictly smaller than unity.12 Consequently, their private gains from search eﬀort are generally smaller
than their social contribution (Hosios 1990). Nevertheless, we set α = ξ in order to facilitate comparison
with the existing literature.
We calibrate the law of motion for the technology shock by setting the monthly autocorrelation
coeﬃcient ρ equal to 0.9830 and the standard deviation σǫ equal to 0.0044. The monthly autocorrelation
coeﬃcient is chosen to match the conventionally used quarterly value of 0.95 (Cooley & Prescott 1995).
Furthermore, we set the standard deviation of the monthly process so that the volatility of the time-
aggregated Solow residual is in accordance with a standard-calibrated quarterly real business cycle model
(Cooley & Prescott 1995).13
Notice that our calibration ensures that the reservation value of the ﬁrm (wl)max is larger than the
reservation value of the household (wl)min.
3.2 Results
This section examines the quantitative performance of the modiﬁed job matching model. We analyze
how the chosen wage determination mechanism and the costs of labor adjustment, respectively, aﬀect the
dynamics of the model in response to technology shocks. Moreover, we highlight the interactions between
both modiﬁcations.
We evaluate the model generated time series against quarterly U.S. data from 1964:1 to 2004:3. Most
of the time series are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FREDr). In addition, we use the
expanded unemployment series from Hall (2005b). From this data we construct a set of time series which
corresponds to the variables in our model (see table 3 and table 4). We log and detrend all series using
the Hodrick & Prescott (1997) ﬁlter assuming a smoothing parameter of 1600.
10According to (Shimer 2005), the model allows the normalization of the vacancy ﬁlling rate. Nevertheless, we choose a
meaningful value.
11In the model with linear vacancy posting costs, ψ = 0.01 implies that the average replacement ratio is equal to 81%.
This value is slightly larger than the upper bound (b = 75%) suggested by Costain & Reiter (2008), but still below the
estimate b = 94% of Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008). The choice for b is crucial, because a larger b decreases the surplus.
Consequently, the higher the value of b, the easier it is to leverage a given shock into labor market ﬂuctuations.
12The social planner’s problem is documented in A.1.
13Cooley & Prescott (1995) estimate the quarterly parameters (ρ = 0.95,σǫ = 0.007) assuming that the labor income
share equals 1 − θ. In labor search models, this assumption holds only as an approximation.
11Table 5 reports the well-known business cycle statistics of the U.S. labor market. In particular, we fo-
cus on the cyclical behavior of vacancies v and unemployment 1−n. The data reveal that both variables
are highly volatile and very persistent. In addition, vacancies are clearly pro-cyclical whereas unem-
ployment is strongly counter-cyclical. Consequently, vacancies and unemployment are almost perfectly
negatively correlated (ρV U = −0.96). Due to the strong persistence of both variables, we observe that the
negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment remains also at leads and lags (Fujita 2004).
Hence, the dynamic correlation structure between vacancies and unemployment follows a pronounced
U-shape (see table 6 and ﬁgure 3). This pattern is known as the “dynamic Beveridge curve”.14 Further-
more, we observe that the wage bill per worker wl and output per worker y/n are only weakly correlated
(see table 7).
We log-linearize the model around the non-stochastic steady state and solve for the recursive law
of motion using the “Toolkit” from Uhlig (1998).15 Corresponding to the U.S. data sample period, we
simulate the model to 432 “monthly” data points. Subsequently, we transform the artiﬁcial data as
described above and compute the statistics over 10.000 simulations.
3.2.1 Comparative Impulse Response Analysis
We now inspect the model’s impulse responses to a one percent shock in total factor productivity. In
particular, we explore the role of the chosen wage determination mechanism and the costs of labor
adjustment, as well as the interactions between them. Figure 1 compares the impulse responses of the
strategic bargaining model with convex labor adjustment costs (henceforth called the “benchmark model”,
denoted by a solid line), the Nash bargaining model with convex labor adjustment costs (henceforth called
the “NB model”, denoted by a dashed line), and the and the strategic wage bargaining model with linear
vacancy posting costs (henceforth called the “LC model”, denoted by a dotted line). The graphs depict
the evolution of the relevant variables over 96 months (32 quarters).
The Benchmark Model The hiring condition (17) reveals that the pattern of cyclical employment
adjustment is governed by two main determinants: First, the net ﬂow value of the marginal match captures
cyclical variations in the return to additional employment. Second, the structure of labor adjustment
costs determines how fast and at what cost ﬁrms adjust employment over the business cycle. In the
following, we focus on the impact of these two factors.
In response to a one percent technology shock, we observe that the gross ﬂow value of the marginal
match rises by about one percent. The elasticity of the wage bill per worker, in contrast, is signiﬁcantly
lower. This follows directly from strategic wage bargaining (see equation 31). Accordingly, the elasticity
of the wage bill per worker is given by the elasticity of the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match times
the household’s bargaining power (1 − ξ). As a result, the costs per worker increase much less than the
gains. This generates an increase of about 17 percent in the net ﬂow value of the marginal match, giving
ﬁrms strong incentives to amplify employment adjustment over the business cycle.
In the case of convex labor adjustment costs, ﬁrms choose the optimal number of vacancies vt such
that expected marginal matching costs κxt are equal to the expected present value of the marginal match.
Due to the convex shape of ψt, new job matches mt are much less elastic than the net ﬂow value of the
marginal match. Furthermore, the convex shape of ψt gives ﬁrms strong incentives to smooth hiring
activities over several periods. For this reason, new job matches rise on impact by somewhat more
than 4 percent and then remain well above their steady state value for the entire observation period.
This continuous inﬂow of new job matches leads to a pronounced hump-shape in the impulse response
14See, inter alia, Fujita & Ramey (2006) and the references therein.
15The above calibration ensures a unique and stable equilibrium.
12function of employment, which peaks about 2 1/2 years after the shock. Consequently, the impulse
response function of unemployment follows a distinct U-shape.
Moreover, the strong reaction in employment feeds back to the expected marginal matching costs.
Given that employment is a state variable, the impulse response function of expected marginal hiring
costs increases on impact by exactly the same amount as new job matches. In the following periods,
however, the long-lasting increase in employment dampens marginal hiring costs. Hence, the impulse
response function of marginal hiring costs converges relatively quickly to its steady state value. This
pattern reinforces gradual and long-lasting hiring activities and, thus, might explain the remarkable slow
convergence of new job matches.
Finally, we analyze the impulse response function of vacancies. As mentioned above, we assume that
ﬁrms’ hiring costs depend on the number of vacancies that are ﬁlled, and not on the number of vacancies
that are posted. Therefore, ﬁrms always post the number of vacancies that is necessary to obtain the
optimal number of new job matches. According to the aggregate matching function (see equation 1), the
number of new job matches is given by the current level of unemployment and the number of vacancies
that are posted. In response to a positive technology shock, ﬁrms face the following scenario: On the one
hand, ﬁrms have to maintain a continuous inﬂow of new job matches. On the other hand, the impulse
response function of unemployment decreases sharply over more than 2 1/2 years. This leads to a strong
fall in the vacancy ﬁlling rate. The lower the vacancy ﬁlling rate, the more vacancies have to be posted
in order to obtain the optimal number of new matches. For this reason, the impulse response function of
vacancies increases on impact by about 10 percent. In the following periods, vacancies continue to rise
and reach a maximum of 18 percent increase with 2 1/2 years delay. In words, the impulse response of
vacancies follows a marked hump-shape. This pattern is found to be consistent with the data.16
The Impact of Strategic Wage Bargaining We now discuss the impulse responses of the “NB
model”. Under Nash bargaining, the elasticity of the wage bill per worker is not only determined by
the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match, but also by the household’s outside alternative. Given that
household’s outside alternative is clearly pro-cyclical, we note that the elasticity of the wage bill per
worker increases substantially. Hence, the wage bill per worker is nearly as elastic as the gross ﬂow value
of the marginal match. As a result, the costs per worker increase almost as much as the gains. This
implies that the elasticity of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match decreases enormously. Additionally,
due to the hump-shape in the household’s outside alternative, the net ﬂow value of the marginal match
is less persistent than in the benchmark model. This illustrates that Nash bargaining gives ﬁrms much
less incentives to hire new workers than strategic wage bargaining.
In fact, we observe that ﬁrms’ hiring activities decline dramatically. On impact, new job matches
rise only by less than one percent and then fall back quickly to their steady state value. Thus, the
impulse response of employment is substantially smaller. For the same reason, the U-shaped response of
unemployment is much weaker. Moreover, due to the mild response of employment, the feedback eﬀect
from employment on lower expected marginal matching costs is almost not present.
The modest increase in matches, in conjunction with the weak reduction in unemployment, implies
that the vacancy ﬁlling rate reduces only slightly. Consequently, vacancies rise on impact only by some-
what more than one percent, continue to increase slightly for about 3 quarters, and then return slow
and monotone to their steady state value. For this reason, vacancies are much less elastic than in the
benchmark model. Furthermore, we observe that the hump-shaped dynamics of the impulse response
functions are less distinct.
We conclude that strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the elasticity of employment, unemployment
and vacancies enormously. Apart from that, the hump-shaped (U-shaped) response of vacancies (unem-
16See Footnote 2 and the references therein.
13ployment) is more distinct under Nash bargaining.
The Impact of Convex Labor Adjustment Costs We now examine the impact of convex labor
adjustment costs on the dynamic behavior of the labor market. Therefore, we compare the impulse
responses of the benchmark model with the impulse responses of the “LC model”. In both cases under
consideration, the wage bill per worker is determined by strategic wage bargaining. We observe that the
instantaneous elasticities of the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match, household’s outside alternative,
and the wage bill per worker, respectively, are very similar. In contrast, the relative response of the net
ﬂow value of the marginal match in the LC model is signiﬁcantly larger than in the benchmark model.17
Consequently, one should expect that the LC model generates larger employment ﬂuctuations.
On impact, the elasticity of new job matches in the LC model is about three times larger than in
the benchmark model. In the following periods, however, ﬁrms’ hiring activities decrease sharply. As a
result, the impulse response function of employment peaks already after about 9 months. This is due
to the modiﬁed hiring mechanism. Given linear vacancy posting costs, ﬁrms post vacancies in order to
equalize expected marginal hiring costs κ/q(γt) and the expected present value of the marginal match. In
contrast to the benchmark model, expected marginal hiring costs in the LC model depend on the inverse
vacancy ﬁlling rate 1/q(γt) and not on the gross hiring rate xt. In response to the technology shock, the
inverse vacancy ﬁlling rate increases by about 13 percent and then remains persistently well above its
steady state value over the whole observation period. This behavior diﬀers substantially from the rather
moderate and temporary increase of the gross hiring rate in the benchmark model.
Since ﬁrms are forward looking, they anticipate the future fall in unemployment when deciding upon
the optimal number of vacancies. The future fall in unemployment tightens the labor market and,
thus, raises the expected marginal matching costs in the future. For this reason, ﬁrms post vacancies
instantaneously as long as the number of unemployed job searchers is still high. This pattern makes it
impossible for the LC model to generate a hump-shaped impulse response function of vacancies. Instead,
vacancies spike on impact and fall back half way only one period later. This behavior is in sharp contrast
to the empirical evidence.
In the benchmark model, however, the mechanism works in the other direction. Firms’ expected
marginal hiring costs depend on the gross hiring rate xt. This implies that a high level of employment
(i.e. a low level of unemployment) lowers expected marginal costs. In comparison to the inverse vacancy
ﬁlling rate, the gross hiring rate is much less elastic and much less persistent. This removes ﬁrms’ incentive
to adjust employment instantaneously. On the contrary, it gives ﬁrms strong incentives to smooth hiring
over a long period. Hence, the overall employment impact in the LC model is substantially lower than
in the benchmark model.
The Interactions between Strategic Wage Bargaining and Convex Labor Adjustment Costs
So far, we have found that (i) strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes labor market ﬂuctuations and (ii)
convex labor adjustment costs account for hump-shaped impulse response functions. Indeed, beyond
understanding how both modiﬁcations work in isolation, it is important to explore their interactions.
As discussed above, the impact of current labor market conditions on expected marginal matching
costs depends crucially on the speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’ hiring costs. In the LC model, a tight labor market
raises expected marginal matching costs. In the benchmark model, in contrast, a high level of employment
lowers expected marginal matching costs. Consequently, strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the elasticity
of labor market variables through two channels. On the one hand, strategic wage bargaining dampens
the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the wage bill per worker. This stimulates ﬁrms’ hiring activities. On the
17Note that the absolute value of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match in the benchmark model is about twice as
large than in the LC model (see footnote 11).
14other hand, the higher the stock of employment, the lower the costs of labor adjustment. Thus, the
introduction of convex labor adjustment costs increases not only labor market persistence, but also its
cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Furthermore, we observe that labor market variables in the benchmark model are even somewhat
more persistent than in the NB model. This is due to the fact that strategic wage bargaining removes
the impact of the hump-shaped outside alternative. Hence, the net ﬂow value of the marginal match is
more persistent, translating into more persistent labor market ﬂuctuations. In summary, we note that
strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment costs are complementary in generating elastic
and persistent labor market responses.
Robustness of the Hump-Shaped Vacancy Responses In the following, we examine whether the
hump-shaped impulse response function of vacancies in the benchmark model is robust with respect to
the two distortionary eﬀects – strategic wage bargaining and the value of ﬁrms’ bargaining power.
As shown in a previous paragraph, vacancies in the NB model are much less elastic than in the
benchmark model. In addition, the hump-shape is ﬂattened considerably.
Therefore, we evaluate the benchmark model with ﬁrms’ bargaining power set to unity. On impact,
vacancies rise by about 15 percent. This increase is about one and a half times higher than in the case of
symmetrically distributed bargaining power. Moreover, vacancies display a marked hump-shape, albeit
the hump is slightly weaker than in the benchmark model.
However, social optimality under convex labor adjustment costs requires that the wage bill per worker
equals household’s outside alternative. This condition is only satisﬁed if we assume Nash bargaining and
if we set ﬁrms’ bargaining power equal to unity. We now observe that vacancies increase on impact by
about 7 percent, reach a maximum with about 3 quarters delay, and then return relatively quickly to their
steady state value. These results indicate that the combination of both distortionary eﬀects dampens
the hump to some degree. Nevertheless, the hump-shaped pattern of vacancies is a robust result of our
benchmark model.
3.2.2 Simulation Results
This section evaluates the benchmark model against U.S. data. Thereby, our analysis focuses on the
cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment (table 5). In particular, we examine the model in terms
of its capability to generate suﬃcient volatility and persistence in both variables.
The Benchmark Model Strategic wage bargaining makes the wage bill per worker independent of
ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative. Hence, the wage bill per worker (wl) is signiﬁcantly less
volatile than output per worker (y/n), giving ﬁrms strong incentives to expand their hiring activities in
economic upswings. Thus, the benchmark model replicates closely the cyclical volatility of vacancies (v),
unemployment (1−n) and market tightness (γ). This result is in line with the insight in Hall & Milgrom
(2008): Strategic wage bargaining generates endogenous real wage rigidity. This increases the volatility
of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match. As a result, labor market variables become more volatile.
Furthermore, we note that vacancies, unemployment and market tightness are highly persistent. This
can be ascribed to the modiﬁed hiring condition which alters the qualitative pattern of ﬁrms’ hiring
behavior. Consequently, the benchmark model generates hump-shaped responses in unemployment and
vacancies. For the same reason, the benchmark model is capable to replicate the U-shaped pattern of
the dynamic Beveridge curve (see table 6 and ﬁgure 3). Consistent with the data, the negative relation
between model generated vacancies and unemployment remains for more than 4 quarters.
Apart from that, the benchmark model accounts for the fact that unemployment and market tightness
lag the cycle by one quarter. This indicates that the combination of strategic wage bargaining and
15convex labor adjustment costs enhances the model’s ability to propagate technology shocks in the labor
market. On the other hand, the benchmark model cannot match the cyclical co-movement of two other
variables – output per worker and the wage bill per worker. In the data, the contemporaneous correlation
between output and output per worker is close to unity. The wage bill per worker, in contrast, shows
a much weaker contemporaneous correlation with output. Table 7 displays that both variables are only
moderately positively correlated. In the model, however, we observe that output per worker and the wage
bill per worker are perfectly correlated.
Indeed, the almost perfect correlation between output per worker and the wage bill per worker is
generated essentially by construction. Equation (31) shows that variations in the wage bill per worker
are closely related to changes in output per worker. Since this paper is motivated by the cyclical behavior
of vacancies and unemployment, we allow only for total factor productivity shocks. Yet, we conjecture
that adding a shock to the value of bargaining may help to bring the co-movement of labor market
variables closer to the data.
The Impact of Strategic Wage Bargaining In the NB model, both parties receive period-by-period
a constant share of the mutual surplus. For this reason, the wage bill per worker is almost as volatile
as output per worker, giving ﬁrms little incentive to adjust employment over the business cycle. This
contrasts sharply with the data. Consequently, the cyclical ﬂuctuations of vacancies and unemployment
are insuﬃciently small. The same applies to market tightness, conﬁrming the conclusion reached by
Shimer (2005).
On the other hand, the Nash bargaining assumption does not alter the qualitative pattern of employ-
ment adjustment. The model generated time series of vacancies and unemployment remain almost as
persistent as in the benchmark model. As a result, the dynamic Beveridge curve maintains the U-shaped
pattern. Even though, we note that the negative relation between vacancies and unemployment remains
now only for somewhat more than 3 quarters (instead of more than 4 quarters in the benchmark model).
This might be due to the fact that Nash bargaining reduces not only the volatility, but also the persistence
of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match.
The Impact of Convex Labor Adjustment Costs Due to strategic wage bargaining, we observe
that the wage bill per worker is about half as volatile as output per worker, giving ﬁrms strong incentives
to amplify hiring activities. This result holds independently of the hiring cost function. In the LC
model, however, we observe that vacancies spike on impact and fall back very quickly. Consequently, the
cumulative inﬂow of new job matches in the LC model is much weaker than in the benchmark model,
inducing less volatility in employment, unemployment and market tightness.
For the same reason, all labor market variables are not suﬃciently persisitent. This pattern can be
ascribed to the modiﬁed hiring condition. Given linear vacancy posting costs, ﬁrms anticipate the fall in
the vacancy ﬁlling ratio and, hence, adjust employment instantaneously. On the contrary, convex labor
adjustment costs give ﬁrms strong incentives to smooth their hiring activities over several periods. This
causes the continuous inﬂow of new job matches in the benchmark model, generating highly persistent
labor market variables. Thus, as pointed out by Yashiv (2006), convex labor adjustment costs improve
the performance of the job search and matching model considerably.
In particular, the ﬁrst order autocorrelation of vacancies in the LC model is much weaker than in the
benchmark model. This follows directly from the counter-factual shape of the impulse response function
under linear vacancy posting costs. Moreover, the shape of the dynamic Beveridge curve is biased.
Despite the strong negative contemporaneous correlation, the cross-correlation between unemployment
and leaded vacancies is close to zero beyond 2 quarters. In other words, the LC model predicts rather a
J-shaped relationship, echoing the ﬁndings of Fujita (2004).
16The Interactions between Strategic Wage Bargaining and Convex Labor Adjustment Costs
We summarize that (i) strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the volatility of the labor market and (ii)
convex labor adjustment costs improve labor market persistence. Therefore, we conclude that only the
combination of both features generates suﬃcient volatility and persistence in the labor market.
Furthermore, the results presented above indicate that strategic wage bargaining and convex labor
adjustment costs are complementary in generating volatility and persistence. This interesting result stems
from the speciﬁcation of the hiring cost function. Following Gertler & Trigari (2009), ﬁrms’ hiring costs
now depend negatively on the employment level. Hence, large labor market ﬂuctuations dampen the
cyclical variations of ﬁrm’s hiring costs. For this reason, strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the volatility
of labor market variables through two channels. On the one hand, strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes
ﬁrms’ hiring activities in economic upswings. On the other hand, the higher the stock of employment,
the lower the costs of labor adjustment. Consequently, the introduction of convex labor adjustment
costs enhances the cyclical volatility of unemployment and market tightness. The volatility of vacancies,
however, remains virtually unchanged.
In addition, strategic wage bargaining removes the impact of the hump-shaped outside alternative on
the wage bill per worker. Thus, strategic wage bargaining induces not only more labor market volatility,
but also more labor market persistence.
The complementarity between strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment costs is also
illustrated by the dynamic Beveridge curve. Only if we combine both features, the negative relation
between vacancies and unemployment remains for more than 4 quarters. Clearly, the impact of convex
labor adjustment costs seems to be more important in this respect.
Business Cycle Analysis The last section has shown that the benchmark model replicates the cyclical
behavior of the labor market remarkably well. In the following, we analyze the business cycle properties
of the benchmark model more comprehensively. The main features of the US business cycle are well-
known (Cooley & Prescott 1995): The ﬂuctuations of output y and total hours nl are nearly equal, while
consumption c ﬂuctuates less and investment i ﬂuctuates more. Employment n is almost as volatile
as output, indicating that ﬂuctuations in total hours are generated for the most part by the extensive
margin. This conjecture is conﬁrmed by the relatively tiny ﬂuctuations in hours per worker l. In addition,
also labor productivity y/(nl) and the real wage rate w ﬂuctuate considerably less than output. All these
variables are pro-cyclical, albeit labor productivity and real wages show clearly less pro-cyclical variations
than the other variables.
Table 8 compares the business cycle statistics of the benchmark model with the data. In total, the
benchmark model captures properly the cyclical behavior of consumption, investment and employment.
In particular, the benchmark model works well along the extensive margin of cyclical employment adjust-
ment. Beyond matching the standard business cycle facts, the benchmark model accounts additionally
for the low and positive correlation between employment and the wage bill per worker found in U.S. data
(see table 9).
Furthermore, the data reveal that the empirical correlation between total hours and the real wage
rate is essentially zero. This pattern is often referred to as the “Dunlop-Tarshis observation”.18 However,
we observe that the benchmark model cannot match this stylized fact as closely as the other features of
the U.S. business cycle. Nevertheless, the benchmark model performs much better than the alternative
model speciﬁcations. The failure to match the Dunlop-Tarshis observation indicates that the model cannot
replicate the cyclical co-movement of hours per worker.19 In the data, hours per worker are pro-cyclical.
18See, inter alia, Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992) and the references therein.
19Note that we observe hours per worker in the data. In the model, however, lt might capture rather (unobservable)
labor eﬀort.
17In the model, the contemporaneous correlation between output and hours per worker is close to zero.
This artifact follows from the interactions between strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment
costs. As described above, the combination of both modiﬁcations induces larger employment ﬂuctuations
than the other model speciﬁcations. This leads to larger output ﬂuctuations, implying a strong income
eﬀect. On the other hand, the combination of strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment
leads to a fast decline in labor productivity. This implies that the intertemporal substitution eﬀect is
relatively weak. Consequently, workers grant more value to leisure and, thus, make less (additional) labor
eﬀort in economic upswings.
Apart from that, the counter-factual behavior of hours per worker biases also the cyclical properties
of some other variables, like the real wage rate. Given that the real wage rate is deﬁned as the wage bill
per worker over hours per worker, the real wage rate has to account for almost the whole pro-cyclicality
of the individual wage bill. As a result, the model generated real wage rate is highly pro-cyclical – in
stark contrast to the data. Furthermore, labor productivity is too pro-cyclical and total hours are too
less volatile.
For the same reason, we observe that the benchmark model cannot fully account for the relatively high
volatility of the aggregate wage bill. In addition, the aggregate wage bill is too pro-cyclical. Hence, the
benchmark model generates too much volatility in the labor share and underestimates its lead. Yet, the
benchmark model still improves the dynamic behavior of the labor share slightly compared to previous
studies (Andolfatto 1996).
Moreover, we note that output volatility is slightly lower than in the data. This may be due to the
somewhat understated volatility in total hours and investment. However, it is likely to increase output
volatility by allowing for variable capital utilization (Burnside & Eichenbaum 1996).
Finally, we analyze the cyclical behavior of the wage bill per worker, relative to the cyclical behavior
of the bargaining set. As explained above, the wage bill per worker satisﬁes individual rationality only if
it lies in the bargaining set. For this purpose, ﬁgure 4 reports the evolution of the reservation value of the
ﬁrm (upper graph), the wage bill per worker (middle graph) and the reservation value of the household
(lower graph) over 12000 simulated periods. We highlight the steady state value of household’s reservation
value as well as its 95% conﬁdence interval. The graphs show that the wage bill per worker is always
in the bargaining set during any period in this long simulation. Moreover, the upper conﬁdence bound
of household’s reservation value is far below the graph of the wage bill per worker. Consequently, all
employment formations are eﬃcient (Hall 2005a). In other words, the critique of Barro (1977) does not
apply here.
4 Conclusion
This paper modiﬁes the standard Mortensen-Pissarides job matching model in order to explain the
cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment. The modiﬁcations include convex labor adjustment
costs and strategic wage bargaining as introduced into the literature by Hall & Milgrom (2008). The
main contribution of our paper is to improve the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment along
two dimensions – volatility and persistence.
First, we show that strategic wage bargaining increases the volatility of both variables enormously.
This is due to the fact that strategic wage bargaining makes the wage bill per worker independent of the
ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative. As a result, the elasticity of ﬁrms’ costs per worker is
reduced by half. Hence, ﬁrms have much stronger incentives to hire new workers in economic upswings.
Second, the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs leads to more persistent labor market
responses. In particular, the impulse response function of vacancies shows a marked hump-shape, peaking
with several quarters delay. This can be attributed to the ﬁrms’ altered optimization problem. In contrast
18to the case of linear vacancy posting costs, ﬁrms’ hiring costs now depend on the number of vacancies
that are ﬁlled, and not on the number of vacancies that are posted. Thus, marginal hiring costs under
convex labor adjustment costs are less volatile and less persistent than under linear vacancy posting costs,
giving ﬁrms strong incentives to smooth their hiring activities.
Moreover, we observe that strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment costs are comple-
mentary in generating labor market volatility and persistence. This interesting result stems from the
speciﬁcation of the hiring cost function. Following Gertler & Trigari (2009), we assume that ﬁrms’ hiring
costs depend negatively on the employment level. For this reason, strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the
elasticity of labor market variables through two channels. On the one hand, strategic wage bargaining
enhances employment volatility. On the other hand, large labor market ﬂuctuations dampen the cyclical
variations of ﬁrms’ hiring costs. Consequently, the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs induces
not only more persistence, but also more volatility in the labor market.
Apart from that, we ﬁnd that our model gives rise to two distortionary eﬀects. Given convex labor
adjustment costs, social optimality requires that the wage bill per worker is equal to the household’s
outside alternative. In contrast, we assume that (i) the wage bill per worker is independent of the
ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative and (ii) ﬁrms’ bargaining power ξ is strictly smaller than
unity. Therefore, ﬁrms’ private gains from search eﬀort are generally smaller than their social contribution.
In this case, the dynamic behavior of the wage bill per worker is not socially optimal (Hosios 1990).
It would be interesting to extend our analysis toward endogenizing the value of bargaining. To our
knowledge, the only paper that attempts to address this issue is by Knabe (2009). The study of such
questions, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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22A Computations
A.1 Social Planner Solution with Convex Labor Adjustment Costs



















tnt − ct, (34)
nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + mt. (35)
The ﬁrst order conditions are given as:
ct : λt = 1/ct, (36)
lt : λtF2(kt,ntlt) = φ1(1 − lt)−η, (37)
kt+1 : λt = βEt [U1(Ωt+1)], (38)
nt+1 :  t = βEt [U2(Ωt+1)], (39)
vt :  t = λtκxt. (40)
The envelope conditions are given as:








λtF2(kt,ntlt)lt +  t
￿





Consequently, the social planner solution is deﬁned by following conditions:
λt = βEtλt+1[F1(kt+1,nt+1lt+1) + 1 − δ], (43)
λtF2(kt,ntlt) = φ1(1 − lt)−η, (44)
 t = λtκxt, (45)
























nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + mt. (48)
23A.2 The Market Solution is generally not Socially Optimal
The surplus St (in utility units) equals the social beneﬁt the marginal match:
λtSt = U2(Ωt). (49)
We substitute this result into the ﬁrst order condition (39):
 t = βEt[λt+1St+1]. (50)
The Nash sharing rule (28) implies that the ﬁrm gains the share ξ of the surplus:
V1(ΩF
t ) = ξSt. (51)
Hence:













Substituting (52) into (53) yields:








κxtλt =  tξ (55)
Instead, the ﬁrst order condition of the social planner (40) postulates:
λtκxt =  t. (56)
Hence, the market solution is socially optimal, if and only if ξ = 1 holds.
24B Tables
Table 1: The Monthly Parameterization of the Model
Description Variable Value Source
Technology
production elasticity of capital θ 0.40 Cooley & Prescott (1995)
depreciation rate δ 0.0083 Kydland & Prescott (1982)
Preferences
discount factor β 0.9967 Kydland & Prescott (1982)
working time per worker l 1/3 Juster & Staﬀord (1991)
eﬀort per job seeker e 1/12 Barron & Gilley (1981)
individual labor
ν 0.5 MaCurdy (1983)
supply elasticity
Labor Market
job destruction rate σ 0.035 Shimer (2007)
unemployment rate 1 − n 0.10 Hall (2005b)
vacancy ﬁlling rate q(γ) 0.3381 van Ours & Ridder (1992)
adjustment costs/ output ratio ψ 0.01 Hamermesh & Pfann (1996)
matching elasticity of vacancies α 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
ﬁrm’s bargaining power ξ 0.5 Svejnar (1986)
Technology Shock
1st order autocorrelation ρ 0.9830 Cooley & Prescott (1995)
standard deviation σǫ 0.004395 Cooley & Prescott (1995)
Table 2: Implied Steady State Values
Description Variable Value Description Variable Value
job ﬁnding rate q(γ)γ 0.3150 vacancies v 0.0932
matches m 0.0315 gross hiring rate x 0.0350
hiring costs parameter κ 18.1406 matching eﬃciency χ 1.1305
real interest rate r 0.0034 capital k 34.2200
investment δk 0.2852 consumption c 0.7048
aggregate wage bill/labor share nwl 0.5881 wage bill per worker wl 0.6534
production function parameter ζ 0.5012 real wage w 1.9603
household’s reservation value (wl)min 0.0164 ﬁrm’s reservation value (wl)max 1.2905
leisure parameter empl. φ1 0.5605 leisure parameter unempl. φ2 0.0504
leisure exponent η 4 replacement ratio b 0.6331
Table 3: Raw Data Series
Key Raw Series Frequency Database Series ID
[1] Labor Force monthly St. Louis Fed: FREDr CLF16OV
[2] Unemployment monthly http://www.stanford.edu/ JF rate calcs
∼rehall/MA-7-13-05.xls (G195:G626)
[3] Vacancies monthly St. Louis Fed: FREDr HELPWANT
[4] Hours per Worker monthly St. Louis Fed: FREDr AWHNONAG
[5] Total Hours monthly St. Louis Fed: FREDr AWHI
[6] Real Wage quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr COMPRNFB
[7] Durable Goods quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr PCDGCC96
[8] Nondurable Goods quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr PCNDGC96
[9] Services quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr PCESVC96
[10] Investment quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr GPDIC96
25Table 4: Constructed Data Series
Key Constructed Series Variable Construction
(1) Consumption c = ([8] + [9])/[1]
(2) Investment i = ([7] + [10])/[1]
(3) Output y = (1) + (2)
(4) Employment n = ([1] − [2])/[1]
(5) Unemployment 1 − n = [2]/[1]
(6) Vacancies v = [3]/[1]
(7) Market Tightness v/(1 − n) = (6)/(5)
(8) Hours per Worker l = [4]
(9) Total Hours n · l = [5]
(10) Real Wage w = [6]
(11) Aggregate Wage Bill w · n · l = (9) · (10)
(12) Labor’s Share (w · n · l)/y = (11)/(3)
(13) Labor Productivity y/(n · l) = (3)/(9)
(14) Output per Worker y/n = (3)/(4)
(15) Individual Wage Bill w · l = (10) · (8)
Table 5: Simulation Results. This table shows the results of the model simulations. For each variable, we report the
relative standard deviation (σX/σY ), the ﬁrst order autocorrelation (ρXT ,XT+1), the phase shift relative to output (in
parenthesis), and the contemporaneous correlation with output (ρXY ).
v 1 − n γ y/n wl
U.S. Business Cycle Facts
σX/σY 7.35 6.31 13.51 0.57 0.60
ρXT ,XT+1 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.76 0.85
ρXY (+1) 0.86 (+1) -0.80 (+1) 0.84 (-3) 0.53 (-1) 0.55
Strategic Wage Bargaining with Convex Labor Adjustment Costs
σX/σY 9.84 7.08 16.24 0.63 0.37
ρXT,T+1 0.87 0.93 0.91 0.68 0.68
ρXY (0) 0.99 (+1) -0.90 (+1) 0.94 (-1) 0.62 (-1) 0.62
Nash Bargaining with Convex Labor Adjustment Costs
σX/σY 1.42 1.00 2.30 0.92 0.88
ρXT,T+1 0.83 0.91 0.89 0.76 0.77
ρXY (0) 0.99 (+1) -0.88 (0) 0.93 (0) 1.00 (0) 1.00
Strategic Wage Bargaining with Linear Vacancy Posting Costs
σX/σY 10.01 6.19 14.82 0.42 0.22
ρXT,T+1 0.60 0.83 0.76 0.57 0.57
ρXY (0) 0.88 (0) -0.99 (0) 0.98 (-1) 0.85 (-1) 0.85
Table 6: The Dynamic Beveridge Curve. The table shows the correlation coeﬃcients between unemployment ut and
vacancies vt+k, lagged respectively leaded by k quarters.
U.S. Data -0.15 -0.35 -0.57 -0.77 -0.91 -0.96 -0.86 -0.67 -0.45 -0.20 0.02
B’mark Model -0.30 -0.50 -0.69 -0.86 -0.96 -0.94 -0.76 -0.54 -0.32 -0.13 0.04
NB Model -0.22 -0.41 -0.62 -0.82 -0.95 -0.93 -0.71 -0.46 -0.23 -0.04 0.11
LC Model -0.07 -0.22 -0.40 -0.62 -0.84 -0.90 -0.51 -0.22 -0.05 0.06 0.14
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
26Table 7: The Dynamic Cross-Correlation Pattern. The table shows the correlation coeﬃcients between the wage bill per
worker wtlt and output per worker yt+k/nt+k, lagged respectively leaded by k quarters.
U.S. Data 0.30 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.31 0.12 -0.04 -0.21 -0.31
B’mark Model -0.17 -0.07 0.09 0.33 0.68 1.00 0.68 0.33 0.09 -0.06 -0.16
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Table 8: Business Cycle Statistics. For each variable, the table reports the relative standard deviation (σX/σY ), the ﬁrst
order autocorrelation (ρXT ,XT+1), the phase shift relative to output (in parenthesis), and the contemporaneous correlation
with output (ρXY ).
c i nl n l w y/(nl) nwl (nwl)/y
U.S. Business Cycle Facts
σY = 1.77
σX/σY 0.42 3.30 1.04 0.85 0.23 0.53 0.69 1.21 0.74
ρXT,T+1 0.74 0.84 0.91 0.89 0.74 0.82 0.82 0.91 0.82
ρXY (0) 0.81 (0) 0.97 (+1) 0.77 (+1) 0.82 (0) 0.78 (-1) 0.27 (-4) 0.28 (+1) 0.79 (-5) -0.07
Benchmark Model
σY = 1.32
σX/σY 0.42 2.37 0.68 0.79 0.17 0.26 0.63 0.86 0.26
ρXT,T+1 0.81 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.83 0.69 0.67 0.90 0.68
ρXY (0) 0.97 (0) 0.99 (+1) 0.88 (+1) 0.90 (+4) -0.03 (0) 0.88 (0) 0.78 (0) 0.97 (-1) -0.63
Table 9: The Dunlop-Tarshis observation. The table reports the correlation coeﬃcients between employment nt and
the wage bill per worker wtlt as well as the correlation coeﬃcients between total hours ntlt and the real wage rate wt,
respectively.
U.S. Data B’mark Model NB Model LC Model
ρ(nt,wtlt) 0.36 0.22 0.87 0.87
ρ(ntlt,wt) 0.08 0.55 0.98 0.88
27C Figures
Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions. The graphs depict the evolution of the benchmark model (solid line), the NB
model (dashed line), and the LC model (dotted line) over 96 months (32 quarters).
28Figure 2: Robust Hump-Shaped Vacancy Dynamics. The solid line represents the benchmark model. The dashed line
represents the NB model. The dot-dashed line represents the benchmark model with ﬁrms’ bargaining power equal to unity.
The dot-dot-dashed line represents the NB model with ﬁrms’ bargaining power equal to unity.
Figure 3: The Dynamic Beveridge Curve (graphical representation of table 6). The solid line with square shaped markers
represents U.S. data. The solid line with triangle-shaped markers represents the benchmark model. The dashed line
represents the NB model. The dotted line represents the LC model.
Figure 4: The Bargaining Set. The graphs depict the evolution of the reservation value of the ﬁrm (upper graph), the
wage bill per worker (middle graph) and the reservation value of the worker (lower graph) over 12000 simulated periods. In
addition, we highlight the 95% conﬁdence interval of the worker’s reservation value.
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